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Abstract  
While standard theory assumes rational, optimizing agents under full information, the latter is rarely 
found in reality. Information has to be acquired and processed—both involving costs. In rational-
inattentiveness models agents update their information set only when the beneﬁt outweighs the 
information cost. We test the rational-inattentiveness model in a controlled laboratory environment. 
Our design is a forecasting task with costly information and a clear cost-benefit structure. While we 
find numerous deviations from the model predictions on the individual level, the aggregate results 
are clearly consistent with rational-inattentiveness and sticky information models rejecting simpler 
behavioral heuristics. 
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1 Introduction  
The assumption of fully informed decision makers who rationally optimize is a popular 
punching bag for behavioral economists. We pick up the aspect of full information: In many 
situations decision makers do not have the information they need for optimal decisions but must 
acquire this information first. Acquiring and processing information is costly so before the decision 
can be made the decision maker must solve the problem of how much information to acquire.  
The economic standard approach to this problem is to assume that decision makers take 
decision and information costs into account and optimize over the optimization problem. This has 
been proposed in the context of expectation formation (see Feige and Pearce 1976, Conlisk 1988, 
Reis 2006a, 2006b, Sims 2003, 2006) and is also the idea of the literature on optimal search and 
stopping (see Rapoport and Tversky 1970, Weitzman 1979, Bikhchandani and Sharma 1996). 
Behavioral economists have challenged this approach in the recent years, because 
optimization over optimization can lead to infinite regress problems (see Lipman and McCardle 1991, 
Conlisk 1996, Goldstein et al. 2001). Furthermore, many problems of optimal decision making are 
very complicated and in many cases do not even have an analytical solution. Given their limited 
cognitive abilities humans can only be boundedly rational which typically implies the use of simple 
heuristics instead of sophisticated optimization algorithms (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999, Selten 2001). 
Experimental research confirms that individual behavior in situations with decision costs is often 
better described by simple heuristics than by optimization (e.g. Hey 1982, Pingle 1992, Gabaix et al. 
2006, Schunk and Winter 2009).  
While the experimental findings that individuals use heuristics to make decisions are very 
convincing, there is the problem of what they imply for the modeling of average or aggregate 
behavior. There are many different heuristics that can be used to solve problems and which 
heuristics are used is highly case-specific and context-dependent. Furthermore, experiments show 
that even for the same task there is considerable heterogeneity among individuals regarding the 
heuristics they use (see Schunk and Winter 2009, Hommes 2011). Under these conditions it may be 
very implausible to use a single heuristic to describe the behavior of the average decision maker in an 
abstract market setting. Models with optimizing representative agents may still be a valid modeling 
choice, if they are not interpreted as descriptive models of individual behavior but merely as 
predictive models of aggregate behavior. The individual use of many different heuristics could 
generate aggregate results which are predicted by the optimization model if there is no systematic 
bias that affects all heuristics in the same way. 
We use a laboratory experiment with costly information acquisition in which subjects have to 
forecast a stochastic process to test whether an optimization model can predict subjects’ average 
information updating behavior. Our experiment is inspired by the models on rational inattentiveness 
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(Sims 2003, 2006, Reis 2006a, Reis 2006b) in which maximizing producers or consumers do not use 
all available information in each period to form forecasts, because gathering and processing 
information is costly. In these models, rational agents update their information set only when the 
beneﬁt of an improved forecast is high enough relative to the information cost. Otherwise they 
ignore potentially available information and use outdated information to make predictions. 
These models are highly relevant for macroeconomics as they provide a justification for the 
sticky-information Phillips curve. Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007) proposed the sticky-information 
Phillips curve as an alternative to the standard sticky-price Phillips curve. In sticky-information 
models subjects make choices in every period, but do not update their information set before each 
choice. As a consequence subjects form their expectations partly on the basis of out-dated 
information. The empirical evidence with respect to the validity of sticky-information models is 
mixed. Support for the sticky-information Phillips curve is reported in Döpke et al. (2008), Dupor et 
al. (2010), and Mankiw and Reis (2007) while Coibion (2010), Korenok (2008), and Korenok et al. 
(2010) ﬁnd that the sticky-information models ﬁt the data rather poorly. One problem that typically 
plagues these studies using aggregate data is that subjects’ expectations are hard to measure and 
that their individual information sets are unobservable. Experiments are less affected by these 
informational problems and can provide additional evidence on the microfoundations of the sticky-
information Phillips curve. 
We focus on the central implication of rational-inattentiveness models: subjects balance costs 
and benefits of information acquisition and processing and rationally ignore available information if 
the costs exceed the benefits. The lab experiment allows us to control the costs and benefits of 
information perfectly and to generate a clear theoretical benchmark of optimal behavior. In an 
individual choice experiment, subjects have to predict the realization of a simple stochastic process 
in several periods. In each period, subjects can choose between forecasting without new information 
(guessing) or buying information. All information is perfect providing the true value of the process in 
the current period. As the process is autocorrelated, information generates a positive but diminishing 
benefit for all future forecasts.2  
Our aggregate results are consistent with rational inattentiveness. In the aggregate, 
observations are not significantly different from the model predictions, i.e. agents behave as if they 
are able to calculate the optimal length of inattention. Our alternative, a simple myopic heuristic, is 
not a good description of subjects’ behavior. We find that subjects’ responses to information costs 
                                                          
2 To our knowledge, there are no previous studies examining rational inattention experimentally except for 
Cheremukhin et al. (2011). The authors use data from repeated binary lottery choices to evaluate a rational 
inattention model and estimate risk attitudes as well as information costs, finding general support for their 
model. 
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and to the nature of the process to be forecasted are in line with the theory. Individual forecasts, 
however, are often not optimal given the information set. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and section 3 
discusses the design and the hypothesis that will be tested. The experimental procedure is described 
in section 4. The results of the analysis can be found in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
2 Theory 
Rather than implementing a specific inattentiveness model from the theoretical literature, we 
designed a simple stylized model that captures the main idea of the rational-inattentiveness 
literature and allows us to derive the optimal information updating frequency easily. The essence of 
rational inattentiveness is that subjects weigh the benefits of new information against the costs of its 
acquisition. If the costs are higher than the expected benefit, they may rationally decide not to get 
the available information. 
As one popular application of the rational-inattentiveness model is the sticky-information 
Phillips curve (Mankiw and Reis 2002), we chose a forecasting task to test for inattentiveness. In 
sticky-information Phillips curve models, subjects must form expectations about future prices and 
sometimes do so based on outdated information sets. 
We model a situation in which subjects forecast realizations 𝑝 of a stochastic process. The 
stochastic process is a random walk in which the innovation εt is limited to a fixed number of 
realizations drawn from a uniform distribution: 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , (1) 
with 𝜀t ∈ {x1, … , xn} and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥𝑖) = 1/n ∀𝑖. 
The initial value 𝑝0 of the stochastic process is given, all possible realizations of the random 
walk for the whole forecast horizon and the corresponding probabilities 𝑞𝑗𝑡 of each realization j in 
each period t can be calculated. Forecasting the realizations of the stochastic process reduces to 
guessing one of the possible values. The best forecast is the value with the highest probability 𝑞𝑡
∗, 
which is decreasing in the number of periods between information updates. In each period 𝑡, agents 
choose whether to acquire information. Information is perfect, i.e. the agent observes the current 
realization of the process, 𝑝𝑡. The information costs are fixed and equal to 𝑐. If they do not acquire 
information they have to guess the current realization. Observing the realization is equivalent to 
guessing correctly. The more periods a participant does not update his information the more 
realizations of the random walk are possible and therefore 𝑞𝑡
∗ decreases with inattentiveness. If εt is 
drawn from a symmetric set with the expected value 0 (Etεt = 0), 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1 is the best forecast. 
In each period a correct guess generates a fixed payoff of 𝑏, an incorrect guess generates a 
payoff of 0. Observing the realization generates a safe payoff 𝑏 − 𝑐 while guessing results in an 
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expected payoff 𝑏 ∙ 𝑞𝑡
∗. The certain payoff remains constant but the expected payoffs decline in the 
number of periods without an information update. This tradeoff between information costs and 
declining expected payoffs of guessing implies a deterministic optimal updating frequency.  
Given a finite number of forecasting periods 𝑁, a risk neutral agent aiming to maximize 
expected payoffs will choose the updating frequency 𝑇: 
 𝑇∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸(Π(𝑇))  (2) 
with 𝐸(Π(𝑇)) = ⌊
𝑁
𝑇
⌋ ([𝑏 − 𝑐] + 𝑏 ∑ 𝑞𝑡
∗𝑇−1
𝑡=1 ) + 𝑏 ∑ 𝑞𝑡
∗𝑁 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑇
𝑡=1  (3) 
The expected payoff contains the safe element (b-c) which is earned whenever the subject 
buys information. The uncertain element 𝑏 ∑ 𝑞𝑡
∗ 𝑇−1𝑡=1 results from guessing that value of 𝑝 which has 
the highest probability 𝑞𝑡
∗ in period 𝑡 in which no information is acquired. 𝑇 − 1 is the length of 
inattentiveness between two updating periods resulting from the decision to update information 
every 𝑇 periods. We define 𝐼 ≡ 𝑇 − 1. Within a finite number of 𝑁 periods, not every updating 
frequency 𝑇 is feasible without a remainder (𝑁 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑇). In those remaining periods, it is optimal to 
guess based on the information set acquired in the last updating.  
A rational, profit-maximizing agent would determine 𝑇∗ by computing and comparing 
expected profits in (3) for different updating frequencies 𝑇. It is difficult to provide a closed-form 
general solution to the problem of finding the optimal 𝑇∗, because of the complication that not every 
given 𝑁 is divisible by all potential 𝑇. It is clear that the optimal 𝑇∗ exists and depends positively on 
the costs 𝑐, the number of periods 𝑁, and the number 𝑛 of possible realizations of εt which 
determines 𝑞𝑡
∗. For a given set of parameters 𝑇∗ can be identified by iterative computation. 
In our view, the difficulty to find an analytic solution for optimal behavior provides a strong 
test for the model. It is highly unlikely that subjects will compute the optimal updating frequency. If 
the model nevertheless describes the aggregate behavior of subjects, this is strong evidence that the 
as-if model can be useful even if cannot be interpreted literally. 
It is more likely that agents do not behave in such a strict proﬁt-maximizing way, but use some 
heuristic. A plausible heuristic might be myopic behavior by which agents do not take into account 
that updating information in the current period affects future expected values. Myopic subjects 
might perform a stepwise optimization rather than a complete one. Following this heuristic, subjects 
take into account the expected profits up to the period of the information update, but neglect the 
increased probability of a correct guess in future periods. 
This approach produces a simple decision rule: myopic subjects are inattentive in a period 𝑡, if 
the expected payoff in that period exceeds the net payoff of acquiring information: 
 𝑞𝑡
∗𝑏 > 𝑏 − 𝑐 (4) 
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3 Design and Hypotheses  
The main question of our experiment is whether subjects’ behavior in the given forecasting 
task is best predicted by rational inattentiveness or by myopic behavior. We test the null hypothesis 
that subjects behave in rationally inattentive way. By varying the variables 𝑞∗, 𝑐 and 𝑁 we generate 
different predictions of the updating frequency 𝑇 that allow us to test our null hypothesis against the 
alternative. 
To keep the forecasting task as simple as possible, we at first limit εt to two realizations, 𝜀𝑡 ∈
{−1, +1} with a commonly known initial value of 𝑝0 = 0. The resulting probabilities for all possible 
realizations 𝑝𝑡 are summarized exemplarily for periods 0 to 4 in Table 1.
3 The probability of any given 
realization declines the further the respective period lies in the future.  
 
Table 1: Probability distribution two-step random walk 
 Realizations p 
Period  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
    1     
1    0.5 0 0.5    
2   0.25 0 0.5 0 0.25   
3  0.13 0 0.38 0 0.38 0 0.13  
4 0.06 0 0.25 0 0.38 0 0.25 0 0.06 
 
Table 2: Probability distribution: five-step random walk 
 Realizations p 
Period  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
    1     
1   0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2   
2 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.04 
3 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.05 
4 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 
 
The number of possible innovations of the random walk is our first treatment variable. To 
analyze whether a higher number of possible realizations induces a stronger deviation of observed 
behavior from the theoretical predictions and to test the comparative statics with respect to n, we 
                                                          
3 The complete table, summarizing the probabilities for up to 20 periods, can be found in the online appendix. 
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implement a second stochastic process where 𝜀𝑡 ∈ {−2, −1, 0,1,2 }. Table 2 presents the 
probabilities for realizations in the first 4 periods.4 
The rational-inattentiveness model predicts agents to update their information set more 
frequently in the treatment with the five-step process than in the treatment with the two-step 
random walk because of the larger variance of the five-step process. This variation allows us to study 
the influence of 𝑞∗ in the determination of the updating frequency.  
The payoff for correct predictions is fixed at 𝑏 = 30. In order to analyze the impact of 
information costs, our second treatment variable is c. The costs can be either lower than the payoff 
at 𝑐 = 20 and 𝑐 = 26, or higher than the payoff at 𝑐 = 35. This last parameterization was chosen to 
analyze whether subjects comprehend the fact that buying information might create a loss in the 
current period but increases the expected payoff in future periods. 
Our third treatment variable is the number of forecasting periods 𝑁. We implement two 
process durations, 𝑁 = 12  and 𝑁 = 20. The calibration is such that the length of the process should 
hardly affect the updating frequency. Nevertheless subjects might believe that they should increase 
the length of updating intervals when there are more periods. These three treatment variables 
constitute a 2 × 3 × 2 design that is summarized with the respective treatment numbers in Table 3. 
Table 3: Treatments 
𝜀t ∈ {−1,1}  𝜀t ∈ {−2, −1, 0,1,2, } 
N = 12 20  N = 12 20 
Model Treatment  Model Treatment 
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟐𝟎 
1 2  
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟐𝟎 
7 8 
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟐𝟔 
3 4  
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟐𝟔 
9 10 
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟑𝟓 
5 6  
𝑏 = 30 
𝒄 = 𝟑𝟓 
11 12 
 
With the parameterization in treatments 1-12, we can calculate the optimal updating 
frequencies and the resulting length of inattentiveness between information purchases resulting 
from our competing models. Equations (2) and (3) produce the optimal updating frequencies that 
maximize the overall expected payoffs in each treatment. The corresponding optimal spans of 
inattentiveness (𝐼) are contained in the columns labeled “rational” in Table 4. The myopic heuristic 
generates different predictions which are shown in the column “myopic”. 
                                                          
4 Again, the complete table can be found in the online appendix..  
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In addition to the point predictions for the average spans of inattention, we test the 
comparative statics of the model. This test includes variations in all three treatment variables 
𝑞∗, 𝑐  and 𝑁. The rational-inattentiveness model predicts that the length of inattention does not 
decrease in 𝑐, will be lower or equal in the five-step process than in the two-step process and does 
not increase in N.  
4 Procedure  
The experiment was implemented computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at the RUBex 
laboratory at the Ruhr-University Bochum. The 127 participants were students from economics and 
other fields of the Ruhr-University of Bochum.  
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were randomly seated at workstations separated by blinds. 
The instructions (see online appendix A) contained complete lists of probabilities for the respective 
processes for up to 20 periods. Instructions were read aloud and subjects were encouraged to ask 
questions at any point of the experiment. A comprehension test was conducted to assure that all 
participants had understood how to use the probability tables and how to calculate probabilities 
after an information purchase (online appendix C). 
We implemented a within-subjects design with respect to changes in information costs and the 
number of periods. We decided to test the impact of the process between subjects, because a 
change of processes (or several changes) could have confused participants and might have resulted 
in mistakes from using the wrong probability table. Each subject therefore completed either 
treatments 1-6 or treatments 7-12. We implemented two different sequences of the treatments to 
check for possible order-effects. In sequence 1 the order for the two-step process was: 1,2,6,3,5,4 
and the order for the five-step process was 7,8,12,9,11,10. So for both of the processes the sequence 
of information costs and process durations were identical to foster comparability. In sequence 2 we 
reverted the orders: 4,5,3,6,2,1 and 10,11,9,12,8,7 respectively. We implemented 6 sessions with 87 
participants in sequence 1 (41 subjects in the two-step and 46 in the five-step process) and 2 sessions 
with 40 participants in sequence 2 (20 subjects in each process). 
One of the six treatments was chosen randomly at the end of the experiment and participants 
were paid for the sum of their accumulated profits in that treatment. As the maximal payoff in a 12 
period treatment is 360 and in a 20 period treatment is 600 we normalized the payoffs by dividing 
the payoff by the number of periods in that treatment. The conversion rate was 2.5 € per normalized 
payoff point. 
The theoretical model assumes risk neutrality, but subjects are generally risk averse (see, e.g., 
Dohmen et al. 2011, Holt and Laury, 2002). We hence measure risk aversion using the standard 9-
step categorical risk aversion measure as in Holt and Laury (2002). If subjects are risk averse, the 
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frequency of information updates should ceteris paribus be higher than that of risk neutral subjects. 
The Holt-Laury risk aversion test was conducted at the end of the experiment and paid separately. 
A session lasted on average 80 minutes, the average payoff (including a 4 € show up fee) was 
25.1 €, the maximal payoff was 51.6 €, and the minimal payoff was 8.1 €.  
5. Results  
Our main variable of interest is the average length of inattentiveness 𝐼 over all subjects in the 
individual treatments. For all following tests we first calculate the average length of inattention 
between two information updates for each subject in each treatment separately. The numbers for 
each treatment are the means of those averages. 
As stated before, we implemented two different sequences of treatments to check for possible 
order effects. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we compared the distributions of the average 
durations of inattentiveness in identical treatments of sequence 1 and 2 and do not find significant 
differences in all but one pairwise comparison (treatment 7). However, if we use the t/test to 
compare the average I in the same treatments, but different orderings, we find significant 
differences in four cases (see table 4a in the online appendix D). The observed duration of 
inattention becomes smaller in treatments 1, 2, 7, and 8 if these treatments are moved from the 
beginning of the experiment to the end. Since the conclusions are the same, no matter whether we 
use sequence 1 or sequence 2, the order effects detected by the t/test are not relevant for our 
analysis. We therefore feel safe to pool the observations from both sequences in the following 
analysis. 
5.1 Rational inattentiveness vs. myopic information acquisition 
Table 4 contains the average number of periods 𝐼 in which subjects do not acquire new 
information in the different treatments. The mean-comparison tests show that in 7 of 12 cases the 
mean duration of inattention is not significantly different from the rational prediction at the 5% level. 
In contrast, the observed duration is significantly different from the prediction of the myopic 
heuristic in all treatments. The myopic heuristic predicts that subjects should never acquire any 
information if 𝑐 ≥  30 which we do not observe in any of the concerned treatments. The myopic 
heuristic predicts that subjects should never acquire any information if c ≥ 30 which we do not 
observe in any of the concerned treatments. The myopic heuristic does not appear to describe 
subjects’ average information acquisition behavior. 
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Table 4: Average duration of inattentiveness 
Process:  𝜺𝒕 ∈ {−𝟏, 𝟏} 
N =  12 20 
c Treat. Rational Myopic I Treat. Rational Myopic I 
20 1 2* 4* 
2.09 
(0.24) 
2 2 4** 
2.70 
(0.48) 
26 3 4* 12* 
2.67 
(0.35) 
4 2 20* 
2.79 
(0.46) 
35 5 6** 12* 
4.52 
(0.48) 
6 6 20* 
5.79 
(0.77) 
Process:  𝜺𝐭 ∈ {−𝟐, −𝟏, 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐} 
N = 12 20 
c Treat. Rational Myopic I Treat. Rational Myopic I 
20 7 0* 0* 
1.45 
(0.25) 
8 0* 0* 
1.61 
(0.34) 
26 9 2* 4* 
1.71 
(0.23) 
10 2* 4* 
1.97 
(0.35) 
35 11 6* 12* 
6.42 
(0.52) 
12 6* 20* 
9.70 
(0.93) 
Notes: The columns “I” contain the mean number of periods without information update, standard errors in 
parentheses. c: cost of information purchase, Rational: duration of inattentiveness predicted by rational-
inattentiveness model, Myopic: duration of inattentiveness predicted by myopic heuristic, * indicates difference 
between means and predictions at 5% (or below) significance level from two-tailed t-tests. 
 
Three of the five rejections of the rational prediction occur in the treatments with the five-step 
process. This is not surprising as this process is more complicated than the two-step process. In 
particular, subjects to not recognize that they should buy information in every period, when the cost 
of information is low. An obvious suspicion is that the model predictions are rejected because the 
model assumption of risk-neutral subjects is violated. The Holt-Laury test produced the standard 
result that most subjects are moderately risk averse. Out of the 112 subjects for whom the Holt-
Laury task produce consistent results, 4 subjects (3.6%) are classified as risk loving with a Holt-Laury 
score below 4. 17 (15.2%) are risk neutral, and 81.2% are risk averse (Holt-Laury score > 4) as it is 
common in the literature. The violation of risk neutrality cannot explain our findings, because a risk-
averse subject would update the information set more frequently than a risk-neutral individual, but 
we do not observe that subjects acquire information more often than predicted by the model under 
the assumption of risk neutrality. We find that the subjects in treatments 7, 8, and 12 purchase 
information even less frequently than would be optimal. Comparing risk averse subjects with risk 
neutral and risk loving subjects, we find significant differences (p<0.1) in the average duration of 
inattention only in 2 out of the 12 treatments. 
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Table 5: Change in duration of inattention 
Effect of information costs c 
Treatments Means 
Rational 
prediction 
p-value 
1 vs. 3 
(20/26) 
2.08 vs. 2.67 < 0.09 
3 vs. 5 
(26/35) 
2.67 vs. 4.52 < <0.01 
1 vs. 5 
(20/35) 
2.08 vs. 4.52 < <0.01 
2 vs. 4 
(20/26) 
2.70 vs. 2.79 = 0.89 
4 vs. 6 
(26/35) 
2.79 vs. 5.79 < <0.01 
2 vs. 6 
(20/35) 
2.70 vs. 5.79 < <0.01 
7 vs. 9 
(20/26) 
1.44 vs. 1.71 < 0.22 
9 vs. 11 
(26/35) 
1.71 vs. 6.42 < <0.01 
7 vs. 11 
(20/35) 
1.44 vs. 6.42 < <0.01 
8 vs. 10 
(20/26) 
1.62 vs. 1.97 < 0.24 
10 vs. 12 
(26/35) 
1.97 vs. 9.70 < <0.01 
8 vs. 12 
(20/35) 
1.62 vs. 9.70 < <0.01 
Effect of process type 
1 vs. 7 
(2/5) 
2.08 vs. 1.45 > 0.03 
2 vs. 8 
(2/5) 
2.70 vs. 1.62 > 0.03 
3 vs. 9 
(2/5) 
2.67 vs. 1.71 > 0.01 
4 vs. 10 
(2/5) 
2.79 vs. 1.97 = 0.16 
5 vs. 11 
(2/5) 
4.52 vs. 6.41 = <0.001 
6 vs. 12 
(2/5) 
5.79 vs. 9.70 = <0.001 
Effect of process length N 
1 vs. 2 
(12/20) 
2.08 vs. 2.70 = 0.25 
3 vs. 4 
(12/20) 
2.67 vs. 2.79 > 0.58 
5 vs. 6 
(12/20) 
4.52 vs. 5.79 = 0.16 
7 vs. 8 
(12/20) 
1.44 vs. 1.62 = 0.69 
9 vs. 10 
(12/20) 
1.71 vs. 1.97 = 0.55 
11 vs. 12 
(12/20) 
6.42 vs. 9.70 = <0.001 
p-values from two-tailed t-tests, treatment differences in parenthesis, 
bold face numbers indicate a confirmation of the theoretical prediction 
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Using pairwise treatment comparisons we can test the predictions of the rational 
inattentiveness model. When comparing treatments that only differ in the information costs we 
should find that the length of inattention increases in c for all but one comparison – see the top 
panel of table 5. Likewise, the five-step process should decrease the length of inattention in three 
treatment comparisons and have no effect in the remaining three comparisons. Finally, the length of 
the process should have no effect on the length of inattention, except for the comparison between 
treatments 3 and 4. Table 5 shows that the model predictions cannot be rejected in 17 out of the 24 
cases. While subjects always adjust their inattentiveness correctly when the cost of information 
changes from intermediate to high, they do not adjust correctly in three out of the four cases in 
which low and intermediate information costs are compared. 
So far we compared the average behavior of all subjects with the model predictions and found 
that the average behavior is quite consistent with the theory. An interesting question is whether the 
averages fit the theory because individual deviations from optimal behavior in both directions 
happen to cancel out. Figure 1 presents histograms of the average inattentiveness of the subjects in 
the different treatments. The solid line represents the average of all subjects and the dashed line 
stands for the rational prediction. The histograms show that in most cases the individual durations of 
inattentiveness within one treatment display little variance and deviate only slightly from the 
theoretical prediction. Obvious exceptions are treatments 5, 6, 11, and 12 in which the costs of 
information are higher than the immediate payoff. In these treatments, many subjects acquire 
information too often, but the average inattentiveness is corrected upwards by a significant fraction 
of subjects that never buy information. The shares of subjects that never buy information in the high-
cost treatments and thus follow the myopic heuristic are 18% and 13% in treatments 5 and 6 and 
33% and 30% in treatments 11 and 12. Especially the high-cost treatments show that the aggregate 
statistics hide some heterogeneity in individual behavior. 
Although the design of our treatments allows for ceteris paribus inference tests as depicted in 
Table 5, a Tobit regression of the mean length of inattention on the treatment variables and a few 
controls may be informative5. Δc is a categorical variable equal to 0 if c=20, equal to 1 if c=26 and 
equal to 2 if c=35. 5-step and N=20 are dummy variables equal to 1 for the five-step process and the 
longer process. RA is the Holt-Laury risk aversion score of each individual, female and smoker are 
dummy variables. Table 6 contains the results from different specifications of the Tobit estimation. 
The regressions confirm two predictions of the rational model. The average length of 
inattention increases with higher information costs, but does not increase with the variance of the 
stochastic process as the dummy for the five-step process is insignificant. Subjects are more 
inattentive if 𝑁 is equal to 20 instead of 12 contradicting the model.  
                                                          
5 Since we have a within-subjects design the observations of the same subjects are not independent across 
treatments. We therefore estimate robust standard errors that allow for a violation of independence for the 
observations of the same subjects (clustered sandwich estimator). 
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Not surprisingly, more risk-averse subjects are less inattentive, as indicated by the negative 
coefficient on RA. In our first specification (1), we included a dummy for female participants and find 
that women are more inattentive than men.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of individual durations of inattentiveness by treatment 
 
The dummy for smokers—which is a common proxy for forward-orientation or planning 
behavior6—is not significantly different from zero in model (1). We find that women are more 
inattentive than men even though the results from the Holt-Laury task indicate that the female 
participants are slightly more risk averse than men. The mean of the Holt-Laury score is 5.6 for men 
and 6.18 for women in our sample and the difference is significant in a one-sided t-test at p=0.051. 
Being more risk-averse, one would expect women to buy information more often than men. One 
potential explanation would be that the observed gender difference is simply unrelated to risk 
aversion. Another explanation four our contradictory result might be that the Holt-Laury procedure 
misrepresents women’s true risk preferences7. Eckel and Grossman (2008) argue that in laboratory 
experiments the measured risk preference often depends on the elicitation method. In order to 
check whether the estimated gender difference is just an artifact of the risk-aversion measure, we 
exclude each of the respective variables in additional estimations (columns (2) and (3) of table 6) and 
estimate the model separately for women (column (4) of table 6) and men (column (5)). 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Becker and Mulligan (1997), Khwaja et al. (2007). 
7 We thank the coeditor for bringing this point to our attention. 
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Table 6: Tobit estimation, mean length of inattention 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Const 
1.44 
(1.07) 
-0.61 
(0.51) 
1.70 
(1.13) 
4.23* 
(2.21) 
0.20 
(0.87) 
Δc 
2.85*** 
(0.34) 
2.85*** 
(0.34) 
2.85*** 
(0.34) 
2.96*** 
(0.50) 
2.71*** 
(0.46) 
5-step 
-0.40 
(0.59) 
-0.41 
(0.60) 
-0.35 
(0.59) 
-0.67 
(1.07) 
-0.29 
(0.56) 
N=20 
1.19*** 
(0.27) 
1.19*** 
(0.27) 
1.19*** 
(0.27) 
1.66*** 
(0.50) 
0.76*** 
(0.24) 
RA 
-0.37** 
(0.18) 
 -0.30* 
(0.17) 
-0.62** 
(0.30) 
-0.09 
(0.14) 
female 
1.40** 
(0.60) 
1.22** 
(0.58) 
   
smoker 
-0.91 
(0.69) 
-1.29** 
(0.61) 
-0.91* 
(0.52) 
-1.87* 
(1.02) 
0.06 
(0.48) 
Ps R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 
Obs. 672 672 672 336 336 
 all all all females males 
Notes: ***, * significantly different from zero at 1% , 5%, and 10% respectively, 
standard errors adjusted for subject cluster effects in parentheses. Due to 
inconsistent choices in the Holt-Laury (2002) risk aversion test, RA could not be 
calculated for 15 subjects. 
 
We find that the results from the first regression do not change strongly if we exclude either 
the measure of risk aversion or the female dummy. The separate estimations reveal some differences 
between men and women. While the response in inattentiveness to changes of information costs 
and to the type of the stochastic process are identical, women increase the inattentiveness spans 
more than men if N = 20.  Furthermore, the constant is much larger for women than for men and the 
risk-aversion measure is significantly negative for women, but not for men. Notice, however, that at 
the mean of female risk aversion (6.18), the effect of risk aversion on inattentiveness cancels out 
against the constant. This implies that at the mean level of risk aversion, the average duration of 
inattentiveness is the same for both sexes (neglecting the weakly significant dummy for smokers in 
the female group).  
5.2 Optimality of forecasts 
Subjects’ task in this experiment was twofold. They had to decide when to acquire information 
and to use this information to make forecasts. The best forecast is the realization of the stochastic 
process with the highest probability (see tables 1 and 2). With the two-step process the best 
forecasts alternates between the last observed realization 𝑝𝑡−𝑗  and 𝑝𝑡−𝑗 ± 1. With the five-step 
process, the best prediction in the period after an information purchase is any of the five possible 
realizations and thereafter the value of the last observation.  
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Figure 2: Histogram of deviations from optimal forecasts. Left two-step, right five-step process 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of individuals’ deviations from the optimal forecasts. More 
than 80% of all forecasts of the two-step process were optimal and almost 60% of the five-step 
forecast. One can also observe that the distribution of errors is symmetric around zero in both cases. 
Table 7 shows the percentages of optimal forecasts in the periods after a subject had acquired 
the last information about the state of the stochastic process. In the first period without updated 
information, more than 98% of all forecasts are optimal for both processes. This is reassuring as any 
forecast of feasible values is optimal in the first period with outdated information. From the second 
period after an information purchase on there are differences in the forecasting behavior in the 
treatments with the two-step process and the five-step process. 
 
Table 7: Optimal forecasts in periods after information acquisition 
 two-step five-step 
t+1 1640/1660 = 98.8% 1234/1250 = 98.7% 
t+2 472/851 = 55.5% 189/618 = 30.6% 
t+3 369/456 = 80.9% 113/359 = 31.5% 
t+4 125/233 = 53.6% 82/224 = 36.6% 
t+5 101/138 = 73.2% 54/157 = 34.4% 
 
Subjects confronted with the two-step process make more optimal forecasts than those with 
the five-step process. We observe the pattern that the percentage of correct forecasts is higher in 
odd periods after an information purchase than in even periods, which is because there are two 
optimal forecasts in these periods and only one in the others. Only about one third of the forecasts of 
the five-step process more than one period after an information purchase are optimal.  
Although the forecasting problem in this experiment is relatively simple, especially because 
every participant had a table with the probabilities of all possible realizations of the stochastic 
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process, the large fraction of suboptimal forecasts suggests that many subjects did not understand 
what the optimal forecasting strategy was. Since it is even more difficult to determine the optimal 
frequency of information acquisition, it appears quite unlikely that the majority of subjects had an 
idea how to find the optimal degree of inattention or even that there is an optimum.  
6 Conclusion  
The main question of this paper is whether the average information acquisition behavior in a 
simple forecasting experiment can be predicted by a model of rational inattentiveness. According to 
the model, subjects should compare the benefits and costs of acquiring information which leads to 
optimal information updating frequencies that depend on the cost of information and the variance of 
the stochastic process to be predicted. We find that the aggregate information acquisition of all 
subjects is well predicted by the model. However, subjects also respond to the length of the 
stochastic process in a way that contradicts the model predictions. We also find that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in individual behavior which can be partially explained by gender and risk 
aversion.  
Given the respective information sets, subjects’ forecasts are often not optimal. Whereas 
subjects make optimal forecasts of the two-step process in 53–81% of all cases, forecasts of the five-
step process are not optimal in about two thirds of the cases. The assumption of optimization is 
hence not a good description of individual behavior, which is in line with previous experimental 
findings. 
At least for our simple experiment, a model of rational inattentiveness can be considered as a 
reasonable as-if model of average behavior, even though many individuals do not optimize. Whether 
similar results hold in more complicated settings, remains to be shown. We do not want to challenge 
the view that individuals typically use heuristics when making decisions, but the use of heuristics at 
the individual level might not be visible in aggregate data unless a large number of individuals use the 
same heuristic or different heuristics that generate similar decisions. How well aggregate data can be 
described by heuristics is an interesting question for future research. 
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Online-Appendices  
Appendix A: Instructions  
(two-step process) 
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to any other participant from now on. We kindly ask 
you to use only those functions of the PC that are necessary for the conduct of the experiment. 
The purpose of this experiment is to study decision behavior. You can earn real money in this 
experiment. Your payment will be determined solely by your own decisions according to the rules on 
the following pages. 
The data from the experiment will be anonymized and cannot be related to the identities of the 
participants. Neither the other participants nor the experimenter will find out which choices you 
have made and how much you have earned during the experiment. 
This experiment consists of two independent parts. You will receive the instructions for part two, 
after part one is finished. 
Part 1 
Task 
In this experiment, you have to forecast a variable 𝒑 which varies randomly. Your payoff in Euro at 
the end of the experiment depends on your number of correct forecasts. 
Procedure 
This sub experiment consists of six independent rounds. Each round consists of a fixed number of 
periods. Your task is to forecast the value of the variable 𝑝 in the current period. The number of 
periods in any given round may vary and will be displayed on the screen at the beginning of each 
round. 
Random process 
The variable 𝑝 starts with a value of 0 in period 0. The variable 𝑝 is determined by a simple random 
process: The variable 𝑝 can change between the current period and the previous one by: 
 rise by 1 (+1) 
 decline by 1 (-1) 
Both events are equally probable. The potential events, +1 and -1, will therefore occur with 50% 
probability. Changes of the variable are independent over periods, i.e. both changes have the same 
probability independent of the change in the previous period. 
To illustrate the process you receive a table containing all possible changes of 𝑝 in each round (see 
table 1 in the appendix). Please have a look at this table now. Each row represents a period; the 
columns show all possible values of 𝑝 during a 20-period process. Each cell contains the probability of 
the respective realization in the respective period. 
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Example: 
Take a look at this table: 
 
Realizations of 𝒑 
Period  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
0 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
    
1.000 
    1 
   
0.500 0 0.500 
   2 
  
0.250 0 0.500 0 0.250 
  3 
 
0.125 0 0.375 0 0.375 0 0.125 
 4 0.063 0 0.250 0 0.375 0 0.250 0 0.063 
 
You know with certainty that the value of the variable 𝑝 will be 0 in period 0, i.e. the probability is 1. 
The variable will change from period 0 to period 1 by +1 or -1, both with the same probability of 50% 
(=0.5). The same holds true for the change between periods 1 and 2, again the variable can change 
by +1 or -1. Therefore, the realizations of 𝑝 in period 2 can range between +2 and -2. 
The probability for a value +2 in period 2 is for example 25% (=0.25). This is due to the fact that a 
value of 2 in period 2 can only be realized if the value of 𝑝 was 1 in period 1 and rises by 1 between 
periods 1 and 2. Therefore the probability is given by 0.5 × 0.5  =  0.25. The table in the appendix 
contains all probabilities for each possible realization of the variable 𝑝 in each period—thus you do 
not have to calculate the probabilities yourself. 
Forecast 
You have to enter your forecast for 𝑝 in the current period in an entry-box on the screen. You will be 
informed whether your forecasts were correct only after all 6 rounds are concluded at the end of the 
experiment. 
Information 
You know that the initial value of variable 𝑝 is 0 at the beginning of each round. In each period, you 
can buy information about the current value of 𝑝. This information costs you 𝑐 points. The costs 𝑐 
may vary between the rounds but stay fixed within a round and will be displayed on screen. If you 
buy information, you learn the exact current realization of 𝑝 and your forecast is automatically 
correct without the necessity to enter a value. 
Earnings 
For each period with a correct forecast for the realization of 𝑝 you will earn 𝒃 points. The earnings 𝑏 
can vary between the rounds but stay fixed within a round and are displayed on screen. For an 
incorrect forecast of  𝑝 you earn 0 points.  
All period-earnings in each round will be summed and the costs for all information purchases will be 
subtracted. Please note that in each round you can incur losses if the sum of information costs is 
higher than the sum of earnings. 
Example: 
Assume a round consisting of 10 periods, the earnings for a correct forecast in each period are 𝑏 = 5 
and the information costs are 𝑐 = 1. You bought information in three periods and you made three 
additional correct forecasts. Of the ten realizations you therefore forecasted 6 correctly and 4 
incorrectly. Your total earnings in this round are: 6 × 𝑏 +  4 × 0 –  3 × 𝑐 =  6 × 5 –  3 × 1 =  27. 
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Payoff 
Firstly, you earn a fixed participation fee of 4 euro. Your payoff in euro for this first part of the 
experiment depends on your earnings in one, randomly determined, round. At the end of the 
experiment you will be informed about the quality of your forecasts and the resulting earnings for 
each round. A random draw will determine which round was chosen for the calculation of your 
payoff. Your earnings (in points) will be converted to euro according to the following equation: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
× 2.5 EUR 
Example: 
Assume the round from the example above was drawn do determine your payoff. The earnings were 
27 and the number of periods 10. Your payoff would therefore be 6.75 EUR. 
Calculator 
If you need a calculator you can open the Windows-calculator by clicking on the symbol in the 
bottom left corner of the screen.  
Time 
The time limit for each round is 5 minutes. The remaining time is displayed (in seconds) at the top 
part of the screen. 
Trial 
Before the part 1 starts, there will be a trial round consisting of 10 periods with a time limit of 10 
minutes. The trial round has the same structure as the experiment, except for the number of periods 
and the time limit. The results from the trial do not affect your final payoffs. 
Comprehension test 
Please answer the questions on the following pages before the experiment starts. The questions will 
help you to understand the experiment. You are allowed to use the instructions. If you need a 
calculator, you can use the windows calculator or your own calculator. Please rise you hand if you 
have any questions. The time limit is 10 minutes.  
 
Note: 
The comprehension test is available as online supplement.  
Part 2 of the experiment was a standard Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion test.  
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Appendix B: Probability-Tables 
(Note: The original tables ranged to ± 20 and ±40 respectively) 
 
Figure 1: Probabilities two-step process (positive realizations) 
 
 
Figure 2: Probabilities two-step process (negative realizations) 
Value
Period
0 1.000
1 0.000 0.500
2 0.500 0.000 0.250
3 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.125
4 0.375 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.063
5 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.031
6 0.313 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.016
7 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.008
8 0.273 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.004
9 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.002
10 0.246 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001
11 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
12 0.226 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
14 0.209 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 0.196 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
18 0.185 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
19 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
20 0.176 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000
12 13 14 15110 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Value
Period
0 1.000
1 0.000 0.500
2 0.500 0.000 0.250
3 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.125
4 0.375 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.063
5 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.031
6 0.313 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.016
7 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.008
8 0.273 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.004
9 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.002
10 0.246 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001
11 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
12 0.226 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
14 0.209 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 0.196 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
18 0.185 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
19 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
20 0.176 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000
-11 -12 -13 -14 -15-100 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
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Figure 3: Probabilities five-step process (positive realizations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value
Period
0 1.000
1 0.200 0.200 0.200
2 0.200 0.160 0.120 0.080 0.040
3 0.152 0.144 0.120 0.080 0.048 0.024 0.008
4 0.136 0.128 0.109 0.083 0.056 0.032 0.016 0.006 0.002
5 0.122 0.117 0.102 0.082 0.059 0.039 0.022 0.011 0.005 0.002 0.000
6 0.112 0.108 0.096 0.080 0.061 0.043 0.027 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
7 0.104 0.101 0.091 0.078 0.061 0.045 0.031 0.019 0.011 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.098 0.095 0.087 0.075 0.061 0.047 0.034 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.092 0.090 0.083 0.073 0.061 0.048 0.036 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.088 0.086 0.080 0.071 0.060 0.049 0.037 0.027 0.019 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
11 0.084 0.082 0.077 0.069 0.059 0.049 0.038 0.029 0.020 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 0.080 0.079 0.074 0.067 0.058 0.049 0.039 0.030 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0.077 0.076 0.072 0.066 0.058 0.049 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0.075 0.073 0.070 0.064 0.057 0.049 0.040 0.032 0.025 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
15 0.072 0.071 0.068 0.062 0.056 0.048 0.040 0.033 0.026 0.019 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 0.070 0.069 0.066 0.061 0.055 0.048 0.041 0.033 0.026 0.020 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.060 0.054 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
18 0.066 0.065 0.062 0.058 0.053 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
19 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.023 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
20 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.029 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
0 1 72 3 4 5 6 198 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20
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Figure 4: Probabilities five-step process (negative realizations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value
Period
0 1.000
1 0.200 0.200 0.200
2 0.200 0.160 0.120 0.080 0.040
3 0.152 0.144 0.120 0.080 0.048 0.024 0.008
4 0.136 0.128 0.109 0.083 0.056 0.032 0.016 0.006 0.002
5 0.122 0.117 0.102 0.082 0.059 0.039 0.022 0.011 0.005 0.002 0.000
6 0.112 0.108 0.096 0.080 0.061 0.043 0.027 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
7 0.104 0.101 0.091 0.078 0.061 0.045 0.031 0.019 0.011 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.098 0.095 0.087 0.075 0.061 0.047 0.034 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.092 0.090 0.083 0.073 0.061 0.048 0.036 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.088 0.086 0.080 0.071 0.060 0.049 0.037 0.027 0.019 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
11 0.084 0.082 0.077 0.069 0.059 0.049 0.038 0.029 0.020 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 0.080 0.079 0.074 0.067 0.058 0.049 0.039 0.030 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0.077 0.076 0.072 0.066 0.058 0.049 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0.075 0.073 0.070 0.064 0.057 0.049 0.040 0.032 0.025 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
15 0.072 0.071 0.068 0.062 0.056 0.048 0.040 0.033 0.026 0.019 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 0.070 0.069 0.066 0.061 0.055 0.048 0.041 0.033 0.026 0.020 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.068 0.067 0.064 0.060 0.054 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
18 0.066 0.065 0.062 0.058 0.053 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
19 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.023 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
20 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.034 0.029 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
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